The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by Bibas, Stephanos
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2004 
The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Stephanos Bibas 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Criminology 
Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Profession 
Commons, Psychology Commons, and the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bibas, Stephanos, "The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel" (2004). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 935. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/935 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: 
Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Stephanos Bibas '*
1. I TRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective assistance
of counsel. The criminal justice system implements this guarantee by
appointing counsel for indigent defendants and then reviewing their
performance after the fact, on appeal or habeas corpus. Strickland v.
Washington's two-pronged test of effectiveness asks first whether defense
counsel's "performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."]
Second, Strickland requires affirmative proof that an error was prejudicial?
This prong requires defendants to prove a reasonable probability that the error
affected the outcome of the trial or penalty hearing.3
Strickland review is an effort to catch individual errors in individual cases
after the fact. According to Strickland, the Sixth Amendment's purpose is "not
to improve the quality of legal representation ... [but] simply to ensure that
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.,,4 But does this after-the-fact, case-by-
case evaluation work? The evidence is not encouraging. Courts rarely reverse
convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the defendant's lawyer
was asleep, drunk, unprepared, or unknowledgeable.s In short, any "lawyer
with a pulse will be deemed effective.,,6
•Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law; former Assistant U.S. Attorney,
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York. E-mail: bibas@philo.org. B.A.,
Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. This essay was originally present~d as part of a
symposium on criminal procedure at the Washington and Lee University La~ School. I am
grateful to Frank Bowman, Marc Miller, and Tung Yin for their advice and thoughts on this
topic.
1466 U.S. 668,688-89 (1984).
2Id. at 692.
3Id. at 693-95. The Court was willing to presume prejudice in narrow categories of cases,
such as actual or constructive denial of counsel altogether or counsel laboring under actual
conflicts of interest. Id. at 692 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,659 (1984); Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980)).
4I d. at 689.
5Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN L. REv. 1751, 1786-87 & nn.165-70 (1999)
(reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORJ\1ED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998)); see also Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REv. 425, 426-27 (1996)
(discussing instances of defense attorneys who were on drugs or slept through trial and were not
found incompetent). One article studied about 4000 state and federal appellate decisions and
discovered that courts found ineffective assistance in only about 3.9% of cases. Richard Klein,
The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 632 (1986). Though this study
predated Strickland, the rubber-stamp affirmance of convictions persists even after Strickland.
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Why does Strickland have no teeth? One possibility is that judges may
consciously avoid the expense and difficulty of reopening and retrying many
final convictions. But another possibility is that the very enterprise of after-the-
fact review is doomed to failure. Judges simply cannot see the errors because
psychological biases make it hard to imagine that cases could have come out
any differently. This will be particularly true where the defendant has pleaded
guilty and there is no trial record to review. Strickland takes pains to guard
against one form of hindsight (Monday-morning quarterbacking) but not
against the dangerous perception of inevitability. Part II of this article
discusses these psychological biases, how they skew appellate and habeas
review, and whether judges can guard against them. If after-the-fact review is
not the answer, then perhaps we should focus on making prospective
improvements in the quality of counsel. Part III discusses how and why these
insights should spur legislatures and judges to move beyond complacent
reliance on Strickland to take more active measures.
II. HINDSIGHT BIAS AND INEVITABILITY
Psychologists have repeatedly found that, in hindsight, people tend to
think the eventual outcome was inevitable all along. For example, one study
asked physicians to diagnose the illnesses of patients with various symptoms
who had since passed away. One group of physicians received autopsy reports
that listed the actual causes of death; the other group did not receive the
autopsy reports. All of the physicians then wrote down what probabilities they
would have assigned to various. diagnoses if they had been the treating
physicians. Those who had seen the autopsy reports were asked to disregard
the reports in gauging the probabilities. Nevertheless, those who had seen the
autopsy reports rated the autopsy diagnoses as more probable than did those
who never saw the reports. 7
Hindsight could, in theory, cut in two directions. One possibility is that
reviewing courts could revisit all of defense counsel's tactical decisions,
imagining how the case might possibly have come out differently. This is what
See Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Notfor the Worst Crime But/or
the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835,1862 (1994) ("Together, the lax standard of Strickland
and the strict procedural default doctrines reward the provision of deficient representation.").
6Miller, supra note 5, at 1786.
7N.V. Dawson et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability Estimation in
Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259, 260-61 (1988). More than a
hundred other studies have replicated the same finding in other contexts. See Jay J. Christensen-
Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 150 (1991) (finding 122 studies demonstrating presence of
hindsight bias); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events
After the Outcomes are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312-16 (providing examples of
various studies showing effects of hindsight bias on judgment).
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we call Monday-morning quarterbacking, 20/20 hindsight, or outcome bias. 8
An example might be second-guessing a defense attorney's advice that the
defendant testify because, as it turned out, the prosecutor's cross-examination
was devastating. Defense counsel may take a calculated gamble and lose, but
in hindsight this calculated gamble may look like an error. This bias affects the
first prong of Strickland, the deficiency of counsel's performance.
A contrary possibility is that, looking back at a final result, courts might
regard that outcome as inevitable.9 This assumption of inevitability is related to
another psychological bias: people tend to interpret new evidence so as to
confirm their initial judgments. This is sometimes called the confirmatory
bias. lo Assume, for example, that reviewing courts subconsciously assume that
the defendant is guilty and probably would have been convicted anyway
because most defendants are convicted. If so, these courts might discount
alleged attorney errors, regarding them as tactical decisions or irrelevant to the
foreordained outcome. These biases are more likely to affect Strickland's
second prong, the effect of the error on the outcome.
Some scholars have assumed that hindsight bias would make reviewing
courts too willing to find ineffective assistance of counsel. II But the evidence
discussed above suggests that, on the contrary, judges are loath to reverse
despite blatant errors. Why? One reason is that Strickland requires defendants
to satisfy both prongs. Even if Monday-morning quarterbacking helps to
satisfy the first prong, the air of inevitability and the confirmatory bias make it
hard to satisfy the second.
8See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54
PERSONALITY J. & SOc. PSYCHOL. 569, 569-70 (1988); see also Diane M. Mackie et a1., The
Impact of Perceiver Attitudes on Outcome-Based Dispositional Inferences, 19 Soc. COGNITlON
71,72 (2001) (reporting that, in study, spectators judged actors' intelligence ba)sed on whether
actors won or lost game rather than on actors' actual performance).
9See supra note 7 and accompanying text; Gordon Wood, The Knew-It-All-Along Effect, 4
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 345, 352 (1978) (explaining
that "subjects are either unwilling or unable to ignore outcome knowledge, or are unaware of the
effect of outcome knowledge"); see also Fred B. Bryant & Rebecca L. Guilbault, "I Knew It All
Along" Eventually: The Development ofHindsight Bias in Reaction to the Clinton Impeachment
Verdict, 24 J. BASIC & ApPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 27,37 (2002) (finding that after subjects of study
had learned outcome, "they mistakenly came to believe that they had a clearer sense of
inevitability from the start"). As historian Georges Florovsky has observed:
The tendency toward determinism is somehow implied in the method of
retrospection itself. In retrospect we seem to perceive the logic of the events, which
unfold themselves in a regular order, according to a recognizable pattern, with an
alleged inner necessity, so that we get the impression that it really could not have
happened otherwise.
Georges Florovsky, The Study of the Past, in 2 IDEAS OF HISTORY 351, 364 (R.H. Nash ed.,
1969).
IOSee Charles G. Lord et aI., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
2098, 2102-08 (1979); S. PIous, Biases in the Assimilation of Technological Breakdowns: Do
Accidents Make Us Safer?, 21 1. ApPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1058,1059 (1991).
1IChris Guthrie et aI., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 800~0 I (2001).
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A second reason is that most defendants plead guilty. 12 If a defendant has
already admitted guilt, his conviction looks inevitable in hindsight and it is
hard to argue innocence later. Even those defendants who are convicted at trial
may admit guilt at sentencing, making it harder to then plausibly deny guilt on
appeal or habeas.
A third problem is that guilty pleas dispense with trial records, so
appellate courts have scant evidence to review in deciding how a case might
have come out otherwise. 13 With little evidence to go on, judges may fall back
on their presumption of correctness or inevitability. In other words, defendants
cannot shoulder their burden of affirmatively proving prejudice.
Fourth, many defendants raise ineffectiveness claims, regardless of their
merit. After all, that is one of the few claims that can be raised in almost every
case, as almost every defendant has a lawyer. Courts of appeals, flooded with
frivolous ineffectiveness claims, approach each one with a jaundiced eye. As
Justice Jackson put it: "It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application
to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a
needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the
search.,,14
Strickland itself recognized the danger of Monday-morning
quarterbacking. The Court's opinion insisted that review be "highly
deferential" and "evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time.,,15 Otherwise, "the distorting effects of hindsight" would spawn routine
collateral litigation and make defense counsel too fearful of being second-
guessed. I6 But Strickland did not say or do anything to guard against the
inevitability and confirmatory biases. Nothing in Strickland cautions judges
against assuming that conviction is automatic. If anything, the exhortations to
deference and the defendant's burden of proof suggest that, when in doubt,
courts should affirm. 17 Because guilty-plea cases lack well-developed trial
12BuREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, at 416 tb1.5.17, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook
(reporting that in fiscal year 2000, of 69,283 criminal cases disposed of in federal district court
by trial or plea (thus excluding dismissals), 64,939 (93.7%) were disposed of by pleas of guilty
or nolo contendere); id at 448 tb1.5.46 (reporting that in 2000, of about 924,700 felony
convictions in state court, about 879,200 (95%) were by guilty plea).
13Perhaps in a few cases it will be clear that defense counsel could have brought a motion
to suppress that would have resulted in dismissal rather than a plea bargain, but rarely will the
record be so clear-cut.
14Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
15Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
16See id. at 689-90 (noting that "intrusive post-trial inquiry" would "encourage the
proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges" and would harm defense counsel's performance and
willingness to serve, dampen his ardor, impair his independence, and undennine trust between
attorney and client).
17See id. at 689 (noting that because of difficulties involved in evaluating attorney
performance, courts must strongly presume that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
or reasonable professional assistance ...").
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records, appellate judges may often be in doubt and fall back on this
deference.
Perhaps courts could do more to guard against the inevitability bias.
Unfortunately, merely telling someone about a cognitive bias or asking her to
try harder is ineffective to correct that bias. 18 Nor does practice make perfect.
Studies find that experience and expertise may moderate, but do not eliminate,
cognitive biases. 19 A more successful tactic is to ask subjects to consider the
opposite and articulate reasons why the case could have come out otherwise?O
Defense lawyers are supposed to help appellate judges see the other side, but
poor appellate counselor pro se habeas petitions may not succeed in doing so.
Another possible approach to hindsight review would be to establish clear
benchmarks, guideposts, or checklists. If, for example, Strickland required
defense counsel to interview all known eyewitnesses to a crime, assessing
compliance would be more objective and less susceptible to bias. Strickland,
however, refused to define what conduct was unreasonable, declaring: "More
specific guidelines are not appropriate.,,21 Though the Court alluded to
American Bar Association standards as guides to what conduct is reasonable, it
feared that particular, detailed rules would hamper counsel's flexibility.22
Instead, the Court has fallen into the opposite trap of giving courts and counsel
no guidance. Deference and the presumption of effectiveness turn flexible
review into almost no review at all, as courts can find some rationale for
almost any behavior. When courts start out presuming that attorney actions are
tactics rather than errors, the confirmatory bias leads them to interpret almost
18See Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 356 (1977) (reporting that experiment
replicated knew-it-all-along effect and found that "exhorting subjects to work harder or telling
them to beware of bias in their responses" did not weaken effect); Richaid M. Kurtz & Sol L.
Garfield, Illusory Correlation: A Further Exploration of Chapman's Paradigm, 46 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1009, 1014 (1978) (finding that training did not reduce
associations made based on verbal associative connections rather than on valid observations);
Wood, supra note 9, at 345-46.
19See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 32, 32-33
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY] (discussing
sophistication in statistics as possible corrective to representativeness biases); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra, at 84, 84-85 (same).
20See Hal R. Arkes et aI., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 307
(1988) ("Having the diagnostician list or generate reasons why other outcomes might have been
expected should heighten appreciation of the difficulty of the case, the plausibility of other
diagnoses, and the information value of the correct answer."); Charles G. Lord et aI.,
Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984) ("[T]he cognitive strategy of considering opposite
possibilities promoted impartiality.").
21 466 U.S at 688; see also id. at 696 ("[A] court should keep in mind that the principles
we have stated do not establish mechanical rules.").
22Id. at 688-89.
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any action as tactical. This became painfully clear in McFarland v. State,23
where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed a capital case in which
the defense lawyer had napped during trial.24 The court found that counsel had
not been ineffective, in part because napping might have been a "strategic"
move designed to elicit jury sympathy.25 If the confirmatory bias is this strong,
then Strickland degenerates into a game of concocting hypothetical
justifications after the fact. Strickland winds up being almost as toothless as
rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, which also rests on
post hoc rationalizations instead of actual reasons.
Perhaps asking judges to construct the strongest arguments for the
defendant might somewhat moderate the hindsight and confirmatory biases.
But I am not optimistic because of the structural problems at work. It is just too
hard for judges to screen out the fact of conviction and imagine being in
defense counsel's shoes before the fact. This is particularly true because judges
have little or no records of out-of-court pretrial and plea-bargaining decisions,
apart from the defendant's own incriminating plea. Thus, they will probably
over-rely on the presumption that counsel was effective, the verdict was
correct, and the plea bargain was sound because the defendant agreed to it.
III. IMPROVING COUNSEL BEFORE THE FACT
Strickland rejected detailed guidelines because its aim is "not to improve
the quality of legal representation ... [but] simply to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial.,,26 Because of the psychological and structural
difficulties of hindsight review, however, it is hard to ensure fair trials without
trying to improve the quality of representation. The two goals are intimately
linked. By ensuring justice in particular cases, judicial review should deter
errors in future cases. Ideally, there should be a feedback loop~ in which the
costs of reversals on the back end spur legislators, judges, and counsel to
improve the front end. Reversals should also have a psychological and
educative effect, serving as precedents and teaching future lawyers what not to
do. Defense lawyers are not the only ones who need to learn from reversals.
Legislators and the public need to see the problems generated by appointed
lawyers' poor salaries, inadequate support, and staggering caseloads. They also
should understand that if they leave these problems unaddressed, courts may
toss out criminal convictions.
Unfortunately, the feedback loop is broken. Judges almost never reverse
convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if they did, legislatures
and the public might not understand the connection between front-end funding
23928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. State,
983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n.l8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
24928 S.W.2d at 505.
25Id. at 505 & nn.19, 20.
26466 U.S. at 689.
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of defense counsel and back-end ineffective-assistance claims. The political
process rarely sits up and takes notice of what happens after conviction, and
the criminal process rarely is transparent enough for outsiders to see the
problems. Without some outside pressure, the political process alone rarely
will address the problem. The political pressure to be seen as tough on crime
usually militates against protecting defendants' rights, discriminating against a
classic "discrete and insular minorit[y].,,27
In one area, states have tried to improve representation by improving the
qualifications of counsel. In capital cases, a majority of the thirty-eight states
that authorize the death penalty prescribe minimum qualifications for capital
defenders.28 These qualifications commonly set minimum levels of experience,
number of trials, and training. These provisions are undercut, however, by the
lack of any enforcement mechanism or relief for violations.29 The reform,
while an admirable step, does nothing to relieve the excessive caseloads and
paltry compensation that are the root of many problems.
A few courts have tried to use shock therapy to wake up the political
branches. State v. Peart30 involved the representation of public defender Rick
Teissier. 31 Teissier handled dozens of felony cases at anyone time with
inadequate investigative, library, and staff support.32 The trial court found that
Teissier's representation of his entire caseload was ineffective.33 It further
ruled that the entire system of indigent defense in New Orleans was
constitutionally inadequate. 34 The trial court ordered the legislature to fund
more investigators, library materials, defense attorneys, secretaries, paralegals,
law clerks, investigators, and expert witnesses?5
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.36 It agreed that the indigent
defense system in New Orleans was chronically overburdened and often
inadequate.37 Nonetheless, it declined to order the expenditure of more funds,
at least for the time being.38 Separation-of-powers concerns weighed against
27This phrase, of course, comes from United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 nA (1938). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 78 (1980) (noting that representatives' desire to be reelected may be the
majority's insurance policy, but that this does not ensure "effective protection of minorities
whose interests differ from the interests of [the majority]").
28Donald J. Hall, Effectiveness of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 43 BRANDEIS L.J.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 6, on file with author).
29Id. at 12-16.
3°621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). My discussion of Peart and Lynch, infra text accompanying







37Jd. at 783, 789-91.
38Jd. at 791.
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such an intrusive remedy.39 The comi took the less radical step of rebuttably
presuming that all indigent defenders in Section E of the New Orleans courts
were rendering ineffective assistance.4o
Even this ruling was quite sweeping and sparked serious change in
Louisiana. Shortly before Peart, the Louisiana State Legislature had refused to
authorize more funding for indigent defense.41 But in the two years following
Peart, the Louisiana Legislature increased indigent-defense funding by $5
million.42 Two years later, the legislature appropriated $7.5 million for the
Louisiana Indigent Defender Assistance Board.43
This clear, high-visibility decision grabbed the legislature's attention in a
way that no series of individual reversals could have. Because the court framed
its decision as a rule, rather than case-by-case application of a multifactor
standard, its decision was more transparent. It thus had more impact on
legislation. This kind of proactive move has its dangers, because it stretches
the traditional role of the judiciary, which is reacting to individual cases or
controversies.44 (The concern would have been greater if the courts had gone
even further and ordered the legislature to raise taxes or expend specific sums
of money on public-defender programs.) But these pronouncements brought
systemic improvement in a way that individual reversals could not have, for
two reasons. First, they made clear that individual ineffectiveness often stems
from systemic failings. Second, they attached palpable consequences to
continuation of the flawed status quo. This goad temporarily offset the political
dynamic that systematically undervalues defendants' constitutional right to
representation.
Unfortunately, this victory was only temporary. Over time, the money
failed to keep up with inflation and caseloads, and today New Orleans defense
counsel still have heavy caseloads. The judicial ruling acted as a one-time
goad, but did not transform the financing and structure that crEfated long-term
problems.45
Like Louisiana, Oklahoma underwent a system-wide change after the case
of State v. Lynch.46 In that case, a trial court appointed two lawyers to represent
a capital defendant,47 who was later convicted and sentenced to life
39Id.
40Id.
41See Lee Hargrave, Ruminations: Mandates in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974; How
Did They Fare?, 58 LA. L. REv. 389,398 nA5 (1998).
42Id.
43See id.; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:144--46 (West Supp. 2003).
44This might be less of a concern in many states, however, because many state
constitutions lack the federal constitution's case-or-controversy requirement. Thus, for example,
many state courts feel free to render advisory opinions.
45Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice TheolY, 90 IOWA L. REv. (forthcoming 2004).
46796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
47Id. at 1153.
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imprisonment.48 The appointed lawyers sought reimbursement of their
overhead and expenses, which totaled $17,073 and $10,995, well in excess of
the $3200 statutory cap.49 These claims did not include any additional amount
for attorneys' fees or other compensation.5o
The trial court held the $3200 cap unconstitutional, and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court affirmed insofar as the cap applied to the case at hand. 51 The
court held that the cap was unconstitutional for three reasons. First, it denied
the lawyers a due process opportunity to show cause why they should not be
forced to take appointments.52 Second, the fee cap effected a taking of their
private property without just compensation.53 And third, the cap arbitrarily
discriminated among lawyers.54 Private attorneys in districts with public
defenders need not take court appointments, but those in districts without
public defenders must do SO.55
Instead of simply finding the statutory fee inadequate in this particular
case and exhorting the Legislature to raise it, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
went further. It laid down an interim set of guidelines to govern attorneys' fees
until the Legislature took action.56 The court set a statewide hourly rate pegged
to prosecutors' salaries, stating that defense counsel's salaries deserve parity
with prosecutors,.57 The court also required reimbursement of overhead
expenses, to match the state's provision of overhead for prosecutors. 58 The
court did not go further in dictating the best type of indigent-counsel system or
the absolute levels of salaries.59
The court's measure was nevertheless drastic enough to spur the state
Legislature to action. The next year, the Oklahoma Legislature created a
statewide indigent-defender board and substantially raised fee caps for
. d 160appomte counse.
Both Peart and Lynch succeeded in prodding legislatures to action. One
might have expected that the success of this approach would cause other courts








55See id. at 1159-60.
56Id. at 116l.
57Id.
58I d. at 1161-62.
59See Miller, supra note 5, at 1799.
6°Id. at 1801 & nn.255-57 (citing OKLA. STAT. A . tit. 22, §§ 1355.8, 1355.13, 1355.14
(West Supp. 1999)).
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might spark sweeping change, though the cases may have influenced favorable
settlements in a few other places. 61
The moral of the story is that while judges can promote effective
assistance of counsel via systemic reform, they are reluctant to flex :,:their
muscles. Most judges see this kind of policy making as inappropriate for
courts. They agree with Strickland that the goal of judicial review is not to
improve counsel systems, but to ensure a fair trial for a particular defendant.
This approach, however, assumes that the alternative of hindsight review can
ensure fair trials. Where psychological biases obstruct hindsight review, and
systemic flaws impede representation, after-the-fact review may be inadequate.
We may have no choice but to fix the front end of the system, as back-end
review simply does not work.
A Peart-type presumption might work as a stopgap solution. Recall that
one psychological problem with Strickland review is the strong presumption of
effective assistance, which buttresses the inevitability bias. If instead judges
presume that counsel was ineffective, perhaps they will be less willing to
affirm automatically. In those areas of uncertainty, such as where the record is
undeveloped before a guilty plea, they may lean towards defendants. After all,
presumptions carry weight where a court is uncertain which side should
prevail. One hitch here is that the Peart presumption might make judges more
willing to find ineffectiveness on Strickland's first prong, but the inevitability
bias might still prevent reversal under the second prong. The other problem is
that reversal of convictions is such a drastic remedy that judges may be too
reluctant to impose it in cases of uncertainty. Further, if the remedy is simply
another prosecution under the same flawed system, reversal may seem like a
waste of resources. But at least at the margins, one might expect this
presumption to counteract these biases and spur some change.
Peart's solution is a temporary one, as one-time funding inqreases will not
transform a system. The Lynch approach is more promising because it rests on
the attractive principle of parity. As Ron Wright has argued, there is much
intuitive appeal to the idea of giving resource parity to prosecutors and public
defenders.62 At the very least, this means paying them comparable salaries;
ideally, it would also include some parity of caseloads and support services,
though these are harder to commensurate. 63 The beauty of this principle is that
it recasts funding decisions not as helping criminals, but as putting each side
on a level playing field. Thus, many states already have some legislation
embodying parity of salaries, and a few have experimented with broader
61 See id. at 1801-03 (discussing Mississippi and Minnesota case law declining to follow
Peart and Lynch); Wright, supra note 45, at 22-23 ("Most often, courts still dispose of
defendants' claims based on inadequate funding by applying the Strickland standard.").
62Wright, supra note 45, at 5 ("Resource parity builds on a venerable idea; the defense
function is just as important to society as the prosecutorial function. ").
63Jd. at 11-19.
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notions ofparity.64 Maybe, just maybe, the judicial efforts to achieve parity can
encourage legislatures to reframe the question this way and peg defense
resources to prosecutorial or judicial resources, to inflation, and to caseload
increases. These funding hikes could be automatic, much as cost-of-living
increases automatically raise Social Security payments to keep pace with
inflation. Ultimately, these systemic changes can take root only if legislatures
will write these principles of fairness into law.65 Given the politics of being
tough on crime, this outcome is uncertain at best.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts face an uncomfortable choice. On the one hand, traditional
Strickland review has no teeth because the strong presumption of effectiveness
and the inevitability hindsight bias cloud case-by-case, post-hoc review. One
could tinker with Strickland by establishing concrete requirements or
checklists for effective assistance, or by weakening or even reversing the
presumption of effectiveness. These measures, while improvements, are
modest at best. Hindsight biases and scanty records create grave problems for
after-the-fact review, problems that are easy to lament but hard to fix.
On the other hand, courts can try to spur legislative reforms through
aggressive rulings that affect many cases. An extreme approach would involve
judicial takeovers of public-defender systems, complete with orders to raise
taxes and expend large sums of money. This approach runs up against the
separation of powers, as broader solutions stretch well beyond a particular case
or controversy. Yet if courts limit their scope to individual cases, their low-
profile rulings will go unnoticed and unheeded. It may be possible to steer a
middle course between wholesale legislation and traditional case-by-case
adjudication. The Peart and Lynch decisions used traditional tools, such as
evidentiary presumptions and fee awards, in novel ways to send messages.
Even this remedial creativity, it seems, is too radical for most courts, as few
have followed these leads.
In theory, ex post review should create ex ante incentives to provide
competent counsel. In practice, the system does not work that way, as there is
no good feedback loop to prod legislatures into action. The moral of the story
echoes one of Bill Stuntz's themes: courts create constitutional procedural
rights, but legislative underfunding undercuts these guarantees in practice.66
Perhaps the best that courts can do is to use publicity and clear rulings to draw
attention to this dynamic, underscoring the need for legislative change to avert
possibly drastic judicial measures.
64Id.
65I d. at 28-38.
66See William H. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6-7, 65-67 (1997).
